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•	 If	Russia	is	to	follow	an	evolutionary	path	to	democracy,	then	the	regime	must	be	ready	to	draw	
the	 so-called	 ‘non-systemic’	 opposition	 into	 political	 processes.	This	 gradualist	 formula	 for	
democratic	change	is	also	the	formula	for	political	stability.
•	 A	number	of	 liberalising	 reforms	conducted	by	 the	 regime	 in	 response	 to	widespread	protests	
following	the	December	2011	State	Duma	election	gave	grounds	for	optimism	that	this	process	is	
now	underway.
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2012	 to	 the	 law	 ‘On	 Political	 Parties’	 introduced	











to	 consolidate,	 forming	 an	opposition	 ‘Coordina-





































step	 of	meeting	with	 representatives	 of	 the	 non-




of	 the	meeting	was	 to	 discuss	Medvedev’s	 plans	
for	easing	party	registration	requirements	and	re-
instigating	the	direct	election	of	regional	governors.	






politics,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 country’s	democratic	
development,	as	well	 as	 the	overall	health	of	 the	
political	 system,	 took	 a	 step	 back	 largely	 as	 a	
consequence	of	these	reforms.	Not	only	were	they	
pre-meditated	attempts	to	strengthen	the	regime,	































and	Medvedev	 (2008-2012)	 enjoyed	 consistently	
high	 approval	 ratings	 for	most	 of	 their	 presiden-
tial	terms,	but	United	Russia	has	only	been	able	to	






















(with,	 for	 example,	 Putin’s	 All-Russian	 Popular	
Front)	or	 resorting	 to	more	electoral	 fraud.	With	
party	registration	requirements	relaxed	to	such	an	
extent	 (membership	 requirements	were	 reduced	












liberalisation	 will	 present	 to	 the	 opposition.	








These	parties	 represent	 anti-politics	 in	 its	 purest	
form,	organisations	created	to	shave	off	part	of	the	
opposition	vote,	mainly	from	Gennadi	Zyuganov’s	
Communists	 (CPRF),	 but	 not	 to	win	 elections	 or	
represent	any	constituency,	except	power	and	the	
regime	itself.
It	 should	be	noted	 that	October’s	 elections	were	
carefully	 staged	and	 low-key	 (evident	 in	 the	 low	
turnout)	in	order	to	guarantee	a	confidence	boost-
ing	victory	 for	United	Russia	 (the	party	collected	























in	 the	 regime’s	 legitimacy	 in	 the	 post-financial	




This	was	 evident	 during	 the	 devastating	 flood	 in	




Tkachyov	 to	 step	down.	This	 could	have	been	 an	
uncomfortable	moment	 for	 President	 Putin,	 had	
it	not	been	for	the	fact	that	it	was	Medvedev	who	
re-appointed	Tkachev	as	governor	back	in	March.	












governor	 elections	 when	 half	 the	 candidates	 (17	
out	of	34)	 failed	 to	make	 it	 through	 the	filters	 to	
take	part	in	the	elections.	In	central	Russia’s	Ryzan	
region,	 10	parties	 forwarded	 candidates	but	only	
4	actually	competed	in	the	gubernatorial	election.	
As	a	result,	a	region	that	was	ripe	for	an	upset	saw	
unpopular	 incumbent,	 Oleg	 Kovalev,	 re-elected	
with	64	per	cent	of	the	vote.
From reform to repression:  
the opposition under pressure
Despite	 the	 regressive	 nature	 of	 these	 ‘liberal’	
reforms,	there	are	still	reasons	to	claim	that	‘oppo-
sition	politics’	experienced	some	kind	of	revival	in	



















of	 Human	 Rights	 re-registered	 the	 Republican	
Party,	which	then	merged	with	other	non-systemic	
opposition	 (the	Boris	Nemtsov/Mikhail	Kasyanov	



















demonstrating	 that	 the	opposition	had	made	 the	
transition	from	loose	band	of	street	protestors	to	the	





































industrial	 heartland,	 is	 considered	 the	 backbone	





Just	 Russia	 has	 struggled	 to	 control	 its	members	
for	much	of	 the	year,	 it	has	nonetheless	discour-
aged	contact	between	its	supporters	and	the	protest	
movement.	 Party	 leader,	 Sergei	 Mironov,	 reiter-
ated	 the	 official	 line	 at	 the	party’s	 conference	 in	
October	 2012,	 warning	 the	 party	 (un)faithful	 to	
stay	off	 the	 streets	 and	away	 from	 the	 ‘sectarian’	
protest	 movement.	The	 liberal-	 leaning	 Yabloko	
party	likewise	put	considerable	distance	between	









come	 from	 the	 increasingly	 repressive	 approach	





to	 justify	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 official	 Kremlin	 line	 of	
‘institutionalising’	opposition	politics.5	In	the	sum-
mer	 of	 2012,	 legislators	 beefed	 up	 existing	 laws	
regulating	demonstrations	and	other	‘mass	actions’,	
re-classified	libel	as	a	criminal	offence	and	adopted	


































November	 police	 raided	 the	 apartment	 of	 well-






















































Pressure building: no winners 12 months 
after the State Duma election
The	 fact	 that	 the	 non-systemic	 opposition	 finds	
itself	 under	more	 pressure	 at	 the	 end	 of	 2012	 is	
self-evident:	the	regime	offered	no	realistic	outlet	














As	 the	 protest	movement	was	 galvanised	 by	 the	
demand	for	‘free	elections’	and	as	the	next	sched-










sloganeering	 and	 Navalny-style	 anti-corruption	
messages	interspersed	with	displays	of	civil	disobe-
dience	–	the	same	position	it	was	in	in	December	
the FiNNish iNstitute oF iNteRNatioNal aFFaiRs 8
2011,	but	without	the	focal	point	of	a	federal-level	
election.



















































































































the	 Putin	 administration	 can	 change	 its	 current	
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